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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dynamic properties of portfolios that sustain Pareto
optimal allocations. We consider an in￿nite horizon stochastic endowment econ-
omy where the actual process of the states of nature consists in i.i.d draws from a
common probability distribution. The economy is populated by many Bayesian
agents with heterogeneous prior beliefs over the stochastic process of the states
of nature. Since Pareto optimal allocations are typically history dependent, we
propose a method to provide a complete recursive characterization when agents
know the likelihood function generating the data but have di⁄erent beliefs about
the probability distribution of these draws. Under these assumptions, we show
that if every agent￿ s belief contains the true probability distribution of the states
of nature, then investors￿equilibrium asset holdings converge with probability
one and, consequently, any genuine asset trading vanishes with probability one.
Finally, we provide examples in which asset trading does not vanish asymptot-
ically because either (i) no agent has the true probability distribution of the
states of nature in the support of her prior belief or (ii) agents disagree on the
likelihood function that generates the data.
Keywords: heterogeneous beliefs, asset trading, dynamically complete mar-
kets.
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Why do investors change their portfolio positions with the arrival of new informa-
tion? For a long time, the conventional wisdom was that these changes in portfolios
were mainly due to risk-sharing among agents with di⁄erent attitudes towards risk.
Recently, Judd et al. [15] topped the validity of this explanation. Indeed, in the con-
text of a stationary Markovian economy, they show that each investor￿ s equilibrium
holdings of assets of any speci￿c maturity is constant along time and across states
after an initial trading stage. They conclude "that other factors considered in the
literature, such as life-cycle factors, asymmetric information, heterogeneous beliefs,
and incompleteness of the asset market, play a signi￿cant role in generating trade
volume." Among these factors, di⁄erences of opinions due to heterogeneous beliefs
have received special attention. For instance, Morris [18] suggests that "...trading
volume presumably re￿ ects a lack of consensus in the interpretation of the (publicly
released) information." (p. 247) Indeed, recent work focusing on asset trading by
Scheinkman and Xiong [24] and Hong and Stein [13] has emphatically put forward
this idea. Hong and Stein [13], in particular, observe that "In conventional rational
asset-pricing models with common priors ... the volume of trade is approximately
pinned down by the unanticipated liquidity and portfolio rebalancing needs of in-
vestors. However, these motives would seem to be far too small to account for the
tens of trillions of dollars of trade observed in the real world ... the bulk of volume
must come from something else - for example, di⁄erences in prior beliefs that lead
traders to disagree about the value of a stock even when they have access to the
same information sets"...." (p. 111-112). They argue that an appropriate expla-
nation of trading volume is one of the highest theoretical priorities in the study of
asset markets and, then, they conclude that ￿...taken collectively, the disagreement
models...represent the best horse on which to bet" (p. 126).
In this paper we assess the widespread idea that di⁄erences of opinion due to
heterogeneous beliefs can generate persistent changes in portfolios. We consider an
exchange economy where investors do not know the conditional probability of the
states of nature and update their priors in a Bayesian fashion.1 Our main contribu-
tions are the following. We ￿rst show that even though heterogeneous prior beliefs
can indeed generate changes in the portfolios that sustain Pareto optimal allocations,
1To avoid any confusion, we use of the following terminology. By a prior, we refer to the subjective
unconditional probability distribution over future states of nature. In the particular case where the
prior can be characterized by a vector of parameters and a probability distribution over them, we
call the latter the agent·s prior belief.
1these changes vanish in the long run with probability one if investors know the likeli-
hood function generating the data and the support of their prior beliefs contains the
true probability distribution of the states of nature. Additionally, we characterize
the limit portfolios and show that, even though agents learn the true probability of
states of nature, these portfolios need not coincide with those of an otherwise iden-
tical economy with homogeneous priors. Afterwards, we show by means of examples
that if one wants to argue that heterogeneity of priors can have enduring implications
on the volume of trade then one needs to assume that either (i) no investor has the
truth in the support of his prior belief or (ii) investors disagree about the likelihood
function generating the data.
In order to purposely disentangle the role of heterogeneous priors in explaining
why investors change their portfolios from those of the other candidates listed above,
we proceed as follows. First, we analyze the evolution of portfolios that support a
Pareto optimal allocation to discard the lack of some market to share risk as the
driving force; i.e., markets are e⁄ectively complete in our model. Second, we assume
that agents interpret public data di⁄erently to abstract from disagreement stemming
from asymmetries in their information. Third, we consider a population of in￿nitely-
lived agents to shut down the life-cycle factors motive. Finally, we assume that
both the endowments as well as the assets returns are i.i.d. draws from a common
probability distribution to isolate from the role of non-stationarities in fundamentals.
Our approach hinges on studying portfolios that support Pareto Optimal alloca-
tions. But solving directly for the portfolios is not always possible and, therefore, we
follow an indirect strategy developed by Espino and Hintermaier [8]. We begin with a
recursive characterization of the set of Pareto optimal allocations. The optimal plan
for the planner￿ s problem is history dependent whenever agents have heterogeneous
priors. This is because optimality requires the ratio of marginal valuations of con-
sumption of any two agents -which includes priors that could be subjectively held- to
be constant along time. Consequently, at any date the ratio of marginal utilities at
any future event must be proportional to the history dependent ratio of the agents￿
priors about that event, i.e. the likelihood ratio of the agents￿priors. Since history
dependence makes standard recursive methods unsuitable, we tackle this di¢ culty
using a strategy similar to Lucas and Stokey￿ s [17]. We obtain a recursive charac-
terization of the set of Pareto optimal allocations in our stochastic framework under
the assumption that investors know the likelihood function generating the data but
have di⁄erent prior beliefs about the probability of the states of nature.2 The key
2Lucas and Stokey [17] characterize recursively optimal programs in a deterministic setting where
2insight is that the planner does not need to know the partial history itself in order to
continue the date zero optimal plan from date t onwards. In fact, it su¢ ces that he
knows the likelihood ratio of the agents￿priors, the state of nature and the agents￿
prior beliefs over the probability of the states of nature. We argue that the sequential
formulation of the planner￿ s problem is equivalent to a recursive dynamic program
where the planner allocates current feasible consumption and assigns next period
attainable utility levels among agents.
Afterwards, we use the planner￿ s policy functions to characterize recursively in-
vestors￿￿nancial wealth in any dynamically complete market equilibrium. This allows
us to establish that the ￿nancial wealth distribution (and the corresponding portfo-
lios) converges if and only if both the likelihood ratio as well as the investors￿posterior
beliefs over the unknown parameters converge.
When agents know the true likelihood function, the well-known consistency prop-
erty of Bayesian learning implies that the agents￿prior beliefs converge with prob-
ability one. To get a thorough understanding of the limiting behavior of portfolios,
therefore, what remains to explain is the asymptotic behavior of likelihood ratios.
When the support of the agents￿prior beliefs over the parameters is a countable set
containing the true probability distribution, the true probability distribution over
paths is absolutely continuous with respect to the agents￿priors and, therefore, the
convergence of likelihood ratios follows from the well-known result in Blackwell and
Dubins [1]. When the agents￿prior beliefs have a positive and continuous density
with support containing the true parameter, the hypothesis in Blackwell and Dubins
[1] are not satis￿ed and so we apply a result in Phillips and Ploberger [21] to show
that still the likelihood ratio of the agents￿priors converges with probability one.
We also show that equilibrium portfolios converge to those of a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium of an economy where the investors￿relative wealth is determined
by the densities of their prior beliefs evaluated at the true parameter. The important
message here is that when investors are Bayesians who know the likelihood function
generating the data and have the truth in the support of their prior beliefs, the het-
erogeneity of priors by itself can generate changes in portfolios but these changes
necessarily vanish.
Later, we give two examples where agents are Bayesians but change portfolios
in￿nitely often. In the ￿rst example, agents know the likelihood function generating
the data but they do not have the truth in the support of their prior beliefs. For
recursive preferences induce the dependence upon histories.
3simplicity we consider agents that are dogmatic in the sense that the support of their
prior beliefs consists in only one point. We assume that their (degenerate) prior
beliefs are such that the associated one-period-ahead conditional probabilities have
identical entropy, a condition that ensures that the likelihood ratio of their priors
￿ uctuates in￿nitely often between zero and in￿nity and, consequently, portfolios ￿ uc-
tuate in￿nitely often. The second example underscores the importance of assuming
that every agent knows the true likelihood function for the portfolio to converge. To
stretch the argument to the limit, we consider an example in which only one agent
does not know the true likelihood function. This agent makes exact one-period-ahead
forecasts in￿nitely often but it also makes mistakes in￿nitely often though rarely. We
show that the likelihood ratio of these agents￿priors fails to converge with probabil-
ity one implying that the set of paths where the equilibrium portfolio converges has
probability zero.
This paper relates to two branches of the literature on asset markets: models
aiming to explain the dynamic consequences of belief heterogeneity on investors￿be-
havior and models analyzing the market selection hypothesis. Harrison and Kreps
[12] and Harris and Raviv [11] are the leading articles of the ￿rst branch and inspired
subsequent work by Morris [19] and Kandel and Pearson [14], respectively. Those
￿rst-generation papers consider partial equilibrium models where a ￿nite number of
risk-neutral investors trade one unit of a risky asset subject to short-sale constraints.
Investors do not know the value of some payo⁄ relevant parameter but they observe
a public signal and have heterogeneous, but degenerate, prior beliefs about the rela-
tionship between the signal and the unknown parameter. Belief heterogeneity implies
that they value the asset di⁄erently in spite of having the same information. Since
each investor is absolutely convinced their model is the correct one, their disagreement
does not vanish as the data unfold.
Harrison and Kreps [12] consider the case where agents have di⁄erent prior be-
liefs over the probability distribution of next period dividends and focuses on its asset
pricing implications. They show that speculative behavior might arise, in the sense
that the asset price might be strictly greater than every trader￿ s fundamental valu-
ation. This occurs, they argue, whenever the trader who holds the asset anticipates
she will able to resell it in the future for strictly more than her short-term valuation.
Harris and Raviv [11], on the other hand, concentrate on the relationship between
trade volume and asset prices. Agents agree about the probability distribution of
dividends but disagree on the likelihood of the signals. Risk neutrality ensures that
the group with the higher valuation holds the asset and no further trade occurs as
4long as that group remains the one who values it the most. Trade occurs only when
the two groups "switch sides."
The possibility that agents learn is addressed by Morris [19] who considers Har-
rison and Kreps￿[12] model but assumes investors have non-degenerate prior beliefs
about the probability distribution of dividends and characterizes the set of prior be-
liefs for which a speculative premium actually exists. He assumes the true process is
i.i.d. and investors know the true likelihood function. Since they are Bayesian, they
eventually learn the truth. Consequently, risk neutrality implies the price converges
and the speculative premium vanishes in the long run. We underscore that even
though in Morris [18] the speculative premium vanishes, asset trading does not be-
cause there is always a period in the future when the asset changes hands once again.
His asymptotic results, however, are a direct consequence of the assumption that
agents are risk-neutral. Indeed, under risk-neutrality the intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution are independent of the equilibrium allocation and, therefore,
they are linear in the agents￿one-period-ahead conditional probabilities. This has
two direct implications. On the one hand, when the individuals￿one-period-ahead
conditional probabilities switch sides perpetually, so do their intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution and, therefore, new incentives for a change in the ownership of
the asset arise in￿nitely often. On other hand, asset prices themselves are parame-
terized by the one-period-ahead conditional probabilities and, thus, they converge
together. We argue that these forces do not operate in a setting where agents are
risk-averse and allocations are Pareto Optimal. Indeed, the persistent switching in
intertemporal rates of substitution in Morris [18] is not robust to the introduction
of risk-aversion since in that case the agents￿intertemporal marginal rates of sub-
stitution are always equalized in any e¢ cient allocation. Portfolio changes might
still occur persistently but this depends purely on the asymptotic behavior of the
e¢ cient allocation. Furthermore, as we emphasized above, the convergence of the
one-period-ahead conditional probabilities by itself does not guarantee the conver-
gence of allocations, asset prices and portfolios.
The aforementioned work assumes a capital market imperfection (i.e., short-sale
constraints) to argue that belief heterogeneity can have a fundamental e⁄ect on asset
prices and the volume of trade. But this source of heterogeneity may matter even if
they do not give rise to a speculative premium and even in the absence of any market
imperfection. As a notable exception, Cogley and Sargent [5] focus on the e⁄ect on
asset prices due solely to prior belief heterogeneity under the assumption that agents
know the true likelihood function. They consider a Lucas [16] tree model with a
5risk-neutral representative agent with a pessimistic but non-degenerate prior belief
over the growth rate of dividends. Even though learning eventually erases pessimism,
pessimism contributes a volatile multiplicative component to the stochastic discount
factor that an econometrician assuming correct priors would attribute to implausible
degrees of risk aversion.3 Thus, their work is close in spirit to ours in that they
use a general equilibrium model without any additional market imperfection. Since
they study a representative agent framework, however, they are silent about the
implications for trading volume.
This literature has not disentangled yet the asset trading implications stemming
purely from di⁄erences in priors and, more importantly, it is still an open question
what the limiting behavior of asset trading is when agents eventually learn the true
one-period-ahead conditional probability.
The second branch of the literature related to our paper analyses the market
selection hypothesis and is exempli￿ed by the work of Sandroni [22] and Blume and
Easley [3]. Sandroni [22] shows that, controlling for discount factors, if some trader￿ s
prior merge with the true distribution then she survives and any other trader survives
if and only if her prior merges with the true distribution as well.4 He also considers
some cases in which no agent￿ s prior merges with the truth. He shows that the
entropy of priors determines survival and, therefore, an agent who persistently makes
wrong predictions vanishes in the presence of a learner. To see the scope of Sandroni￿ s
results, recall that an agent￿ s prior merges with the true distribution if and only if
the true distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to that agent￿ s prior. This
is a strong restriction on priors that is not satis￿ed, for instance, if the true process is
i.i.d., the agent knows this fact but her prior beliefs over the probability of the states
of nature have continuous and positive density. In that case, since the entropy of
every agent￿ s prior is the same, one cannot apply Sandroni￿ s results relating survival
with the entropy of priors either. This is precisely the case that Blume and Easley
[3] consider. In a setting similar to ours, they show that the evolution of the agents￿
consumption in any e¢ cient allocation depends only on the discount rates and on
the likelihood ratio of their priors. They prove that among Bayesian learners who
know the true likelihood function generating the data, have prior beliefs over the
parameter with positive and continuous density on a set containing the truth, only
those with the lowest dimensional support can have positive consumption in the long
3Their model can generate substantial and declining values for the market prices of risk and the
equity premium and, additionally, can predict high and declining Sharpe ratios and forecastable
excess stock returns.
4An agent is said to survive if her consumption does not converge to zero.
6run. Technically speaking, Blume and Easley￿ s notion of convergence is in probability
and they establish their asymptotic result for almost all parameters in the support of
the agent￿ s prior belief. Although we do not focus on survival, one side contribution
of this paper is to make Blume and Easley￿ s results more robust because we show
that every Bayesian agent with a prior belief with the lowest dimensional support
actually survives with probability one (not just in probability), not only for almost
every parameter in the support of her prior belief but actually for all parameters
in the support of her prior belief.5 Our treatment of priors is very general in that
we consider a family that includes priors for which the one-period-ahead conditional
probability converges to the truth regardless of whether the agents￿priors merge
with the truth or whether traders know the true likelihood function. In addition, it
includes cases in which the entropy of all agents is the same but some agents do not
learn the true one-period-ahead conditional probability.
Our results on the dynamics of portfolios that support a Pareto Optimal allocation
are a novel contribution to the literature because neither Sandroni [22] nor Blume and
Easley [3] analyze portfolio dynamics. However, one might hastily conjecture that
their results on the asymptotic behavior of consumption when agents have di⁄erent
priors would map easily into properties on the asymptotic behavior of the supporting
portfolios. On the contrary, this mapping can actually be rather intricate. To grasp
the di¢ culty, consider the simplest case in which investors have homogeneous priors.
In that case it has been known for a long time that Pareto optimal individual con-
sumption in a stationary Markovian economy is a time homogeneous process with
￿nite support (see section 20 in Du¢ e [6] for example). Nonetheless, it has been
surprisingly di¢ cult to establish how these properties translate into properties of the
portfolio in a dynamically complete markets equilibrium (see Judd et al. [15]).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In section 3
we present a simple example that illustrate the main ideas in this paper. The recursive
characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is in section 4. Section 5 characterizes
the asymptotic behavior of the agents present discounted value of excess demand.
Finally, sections 6 and 7 discuss when the agents￿portfolio converge and when it
does not. Conclusions are in section 8. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
5This distinction is economically relevant because both in Blume and Easley￿ s [3] setting as well
as in ours the data (and agents￿ultimate fate) may be produced by a probability measure with
parameters that may lie in a zero measure set of the agents￿support.
72 The Model
We consider an in￿nite horizon pure exchange economy with one good. In this
section we establish the basic notation and describe the main assumptions.
2.1 The Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;2;:::. The set of possible states of
nature at date t ￿ 1 is St ￿ f1;:::;Kg. The state of nature at date zero is known
and denoted by s0 2 f1;:::;Kg. We de￿ne the set of partial histories up to date t as





with typical element st = (s0;:::;st). S1 ￿ fs0g ￿ (￿1
k=1Sk)
is the set of in￿nite sequences of the state of nature and s = (s0;s1;s2;￿￿￿), called a
path, is a typical element.
For every partial history st, t ￿ 0, a cylinder with base on st is the set C(st) ￿
fs 2 S1 : s = (st;st+1;￿￿￿)g of all paths whose t initial elements coincide with st.
Let Ft be the ￿-algebra that consists of all ￿nite unions of the sets C(st). The ￿-
algebras Ft de￿ne a ￿ltration on S1 denoted fFtg1
t=0 where F0 ￿ ::: ￿ Ft ￿ ::: ￿ F





For any probability measure ￿ : F ! [0;1] on (S1;F), ￿st : F ! [0;1] denotes
its posterior distribution after observing st.6 Let ￿t (s) be the probability of the ￿nite








￿t￿1(s) denote the one-period-ahead conditional probability of state
st. Finally, for any random variable x : S1 ! <, E￿ (x) denotes its mathematical
expectation with respect to ￿:










sider a set of probability measures on (S1;F) parameterized by ￿ 2 ￿K￿1, with




￿measurable for each B 2 F. This set includes the subset of probability
measures on (S1;F) uniquely induced by i.i.d. draws from a common distribution
￿ : 2K ! [0;1], where ￿(￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 f1;:::;Kg, with typical element P￿. We
make the following assumption.
A.0 The true stochastic process of states of nature is P￿￿
for some ￿￿.
6Formally, ￿st (A) ￿
￿(Ast)
￿(C(st)) for every A 2 F, where Ast ￿
￿
s 2 S










There is a single perishable consumption good every period. The economy is
populated by I (types of) in￿nitely-lived agents where i 2 I = f1;:::;Ig denotes an
agent￿ s name. A consumption plan is a sequence of functions fctg1
t=0 such that ct :
S1 ! R+ is Ft￿measurable for all t and sup(t;s) ct(s) < 1: The agent￿ s consumption
set, denoted by C, is the set of all consumption plans.
2.2.1 Preferences
We assume that agents￿preferences satisfy Savage￿ s [23] axioms and, therefore,
they have a subjective expected utility representation. This representation provides a
prior Pi over paths and, as it is well-known, it also implies that agents are Bayesians
(i.e., they update their prior using Bayes￿rule as information arrives). But, most
importantly, it does not otherwise restrict agent￿ s priors in any particular way.7
We denote by Pi the probability measure on (S1;F) representing agent i￿ s prior
and we make the standard assumptions that the utility function is time separable and











where ￿ 2 (0;1) and ui : R+ ! R+ is continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave and lim
x!0
u0
i(x) = +1 for all i.
One particular family of priors is that where the agent believes that the true
process of states of nature belongs to a parametric family of probability measures,
￿
￿￿￿




￿￿ (A)￿(d￿) for every A 2 F, (1)
where ￿ 2 P(￿K￿1) is the prior belief over the unknown parameters. The hypothesis
of rationality can be further strengthened to require that the agent is a Bayesian who
knows that the true process generating the data is i.i.d. but does not know the true
probability of the states of nature. Accordingly, we say that an agent with prior ￿
knows the likelihood function (of the stochastic process) generating the data if A:1
holds.8
A.1 ￿￿ = P￿ for every ￿ 2 ￿K￿1.
7See Blume and Easley [2] for a complete discussion on the implications of Savage￿ s axioms.
8The celebrated De Finetti theorem states that this is equivalent to the prior being exchangeable.
9We want to emphasize that even though under A.1 agents agree that the states
of nature are generated by i.i.d. draws from a common distribution ￿, they might
still disagree about ￿ itself. The following assumption imposes more structure on the
subjective distribution of ￿ and it will be discussed further below.
A.2 ￿ has density f with respect to Lebesgue that is continuous at ￿￿ with f (￿￿) > 0.
Another interesting speci￿cation of prior beliefs is a point mass probability mea-
sure on ￿ de￿ned as ￿￿ : F ! [0;1] where
￿￿ (B) ￿
￿
1 if ￿ 2 B
0 otherwise.
When priors belong to the class represented by (1), Bayes￿rule implies that prior






￿K￿1 ￿￿(st jst￿1) ￿i;st￿1 (d￿)
, (2)














￿ ￿st￿1) ￿i;st￿1 (d￿)
R
￿K￿1 ￿￿(st jst￿1) ￿i;st￿1 (d￿)
: (3)
It is well-known that Bayesian learning is consistent for any prior satisfying A:1.
However, this property applies to more general speci￿cations of priors (for instance,
those satisfying (1), see Schwartz [26, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3]), and since our example
4 in Section 7.2 does not satisfy A.1 but it does satisfy (1), we state the consistency
result in the following Lemma to make precise its scope.
Lemma 2 Suppose that for ￿i;0￿ almost all ￿ 2 ￿K￿1 the probability measures ￿￿




t=0 converges weakly to ￿1 = ￿￿ for
￿￿￿almost all s 2 S1, for ￿i;0￿ almost all ￿ 2 ￿K￿1:
2.2.2 Endowments
Agent i￿ s endowment at date t is yi;t(s) = yi(st) for all s and the aggregate
endowment is y(st) = yt(s) ￿
PI
i=1 yi;t(s) ￿ y < 1. An allocation fcig
I
i=1 2 CI is
feasible if ci 2 C for all i and
PI
i=1 ci;t(s) ￿ yt(s) for all s 2 S1. Let Y 1 denote the
set of feasible allocations.
103 Heterogeneous Priors and Portfolios: Examples
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate our main results using simple
examples of dynamically complete markets equilibria.
Suppose there are two states, A:0 holds with ￿￿ (1) = 1
2, two agents, u(c) = lnc
and yi(￿) = ￿iy(￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 f1;2g where ￿1 + ￿2 = 1. Agents can trade a
full set of Arrow securities. Arrow security ￿0 pays 1 unit of the consumption good
if st+1 = ￿0 and 0 otherwise. The price of Arrow security ￿0 2 f1;2g and agent i￿ s
holdings at date t on path s are denoted by m
￿0
t (s) and a
￿0
i;t(s), respectively.























; ￿0 2 f1;2g: (4)
Observe that the evolution of individual portfolios is completely determined by the
evolution of the likelihood ratio,
Pj;t(s)
Pi;t(s); and the ratio of the one-period-ahead condi-
tional probabilities,
pj(￿0jst )
pi(￿0jst ). Portfolios converge if and only if the product of these
two ratios converge. Thus, trading is purely determined by the heterogeneity of
priors.
The relevant margin of heterogeneity, described by likelihood ratios and one-
period-ahead conditional probabilities, changes as time and uncertainty unfold. Con-
sequently, (4) suggests that the conventional wisdom that changes in portfolios are
fundamentally driven by heterogeneity in priors is correct as long as this margin of
heterogeneity persists. Bayesian updating, however, imposes a strong structure on
the limit behavior of beliefs, in the sense that agents typically end up agreeing on
one-period-ahead conditional probabilities. What is pending to explain is the limit
behavior of likelihood ratios when one-period-ahead conditional probabilities con-
verge. Before addressing this issue in a general setting, we consider some examples
to illustrate some widespread conjectures.
Benchmark Case: Homogeneous Priors
This is a particular case of the framework analyzed by Judd et al. [15]. Agents
have identical one-period-ahead conditional probabilities of state 1 after observing
partial history st, pi
￿
1jst￿
. Then, the likelihood ratio
Pj;t(s)




i;t(s) = 0 for all t, s and ￿0,
11and thus portfolios are ￿xed forever. In every equilibrium, agents consume their
endowment every period and, then, consumption and Arrow Securities prices are
simple random variables with support depending only on the aggregate endowment.
More precisely,
ci;t (s) = ￿i yt(s)
m
￿0






From this result and as a direct consequence of the convergence of the one-period-
ahead conditional probabilities, one might hastily make the following conjectures:
￿ Conjecture I: Portfolios converge to a ￿xed vector while consumption and Ar-
row security prices converge to some simple random variable depending only on the
aggregate endowment.
￿ Conjecture II: Limiting portfolios, consumption and Arrow security prices are
those of an otherwise identical economy where agents begin with homogeneous priors.
Example 1 shows that Conjecture II might fail even if Conjecture I holds.
Example 1: Heterogeneous Priors I


















t (s) stands for the number of times state ￿ 2 f1;2g has been realized up to
date t on path s. Since we assume A:0 holds with ￿￿ (1) = 1
2, the Strong Law of Large





￿ a:s:) as t ! 1, for every agent i 2 f1;2g.
By the Kolmogorov￿ s Extension Theorem (Shiryaev [25, Theorem 3, p. 163]),
there exists a unique Pi on (S1;F) associated to the agents￿one-period-ahead con-
ditional probabilities. Moreover, Pi satis￿es A:1 and A2 and prior beliefs over ￿ have
density fi (￿) ￿ ￿￿i
1￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿i
2￿1 on (0;1), where ￿i
1 = ￿i

























where ￿ stands for the Gamma function.10 The Strong Law of Large Numbers can








on (0;1), as in Morris [18].
10Recall that if n is an integer, then ￿(n) = (n ￿ 1)!

























; ￿0 2 f1;2g P￿￿
￿ a:s:
Although security prices, asset holdings and consumption all converge, we want to
underscore that only prices converge to those of an otherwise identical economy with
homogeneous priors. Indeed,




yt(s) > ￿1 yt(s);
m
￿0




and thus Conjecture I holds but Conjecture II does not. The reason is that even
though in the limit economy agents have identical beliefs, the agents￿￿nancial wealth
need not be zero as in the economy that starts with homogenous priors. In fact, the
limit ￿nancial wealth distribution is endogenous and depends critically on priors as
we show in Section 6. ￿
The following example shows that Conjecture I might be false as well.
Example 2: Heterogeneous Priors II




















Observe that one-period-ahead conditional probabilities converge to 1
2 for both agents




The ratio of one-period-ahead conditional probabilities,
p1;t(s)
p2;t(s), is a random vari-









. The logarithm of the likelihood ratio can



















































k. Consequently, the log-likelihood ratio is the sum of uni-
formly bounded random variables with zero conditional mean. Additionally, since the
sum of conditional variances of xk diverges with probability 1, it follows by Freedman




















This behavior of the likelihood ratio implies that individual portfolios ￿ uctuate











(1 ￿ ￿i) y(￿0):
Individual portfolios, therefore, are highly volatile because each agent￿ s debt attains
its so-called natural debt limit in￿nitely often. Consequently, Conjecture I does not
hold in this example and, a priori, this is rather surprising since every agent learns
the true one-period-ahead-conditional probabilities.￿
Why does Conjecture I hold in example 1 while it fails in example 2? The main
di⁄erence is that priors satisfy A:1 in example 1 but not in example 2. It turns out
that when A:1 holds for every agent, the likelihood ratios always converge and, thus,
Conjecture I holds in general.
However, to generalize these lessons to the setting described in section 2 one
faces two di¢ culties that we avoid in the examples by carefully choosing preferences,
individual endowments and priors. First, equilibrium portfolios in a more general
14setup are typically history dependent. Closed-form solutions for asset demands as in
(4) are useful to tackle this di¢ culty but are a particular feature derived from log
preferences and constant individual endowment shares. Second, likelihood ratios are
typically complicated objects which makes the analysis of their behavior a nonstan-
dard task. Closed-form representation for the likelihood ratio, as in the examples
above, simpli￿es the analysis of its asymptotic properties but it is a consequence of
the particular family of priors that we choose.
The rest of the paper tackles the di¢ culties to extend the lessons from the exam-
ples to the more general setup described in section 2. Here we o⁄er an outline. We
begin with a recursive characterization of e¢ cient allocations and their corresponding
supporting portfolios under the assumption that A.1 holds. In section 4, we show
that the evolution of any Pareto optimal allocation is driven solely by the evolution
of the likelihood ratios of the agents￿priors and the agents￿posterior beliefs over the
unknown parameters, as in the examples. In section 5, we prove that the agents￿
￿nancial wealth converges if and only if both the likelihood ratio as well as their be-
liefs (over the unknown parameters) converge. Afterwards, we tackle the di¢ culties
associated with the lack of closed form for the likelihood ratios. In section 6, we
consider a broad class of priors containing those satisfying A.1 and A.2. We apply
recent results in probability theory to prove that the likelihood ratios converge with
probability one, as in example 1. Finally, in section 7, we argue that is key that A.1
holds for every agent. More precisely, we construct priors such that A.1 does not hold
for only one agent while it does for the other. We show that the likelihood ratio does
not converge and, consequently, neither their ￿nancial wealth, nor their consumption
nor their portfolios converge, as in example 2.
4 A Recursive Approach to Pareto Optimality
In this section, we provide a recursive characterization of the set of Pareto op-
timal allocations and prove a version of the Principle of Optimality for economies
with heterogeneous prior beliefs. Throughout this section we assume that A:0 and
A:1 hold.
4.1 Pareto Optimal Allocations
A feasible allocation fc￿
ig
I
i=1 is Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no alternative
feasible allocation fb cig
I
i=1 such that U
Pi
i (b ci) > U
Pi
i (c￿
i) for all i 2 I.




= ￿, de￿ne the utility possibility correspondence by
U(￿;￿) = fu 2 RI : 9 fcig
I
i=1 2 Y 1; U
Pi
i (ci) ￿ ui 8i; s0 = ￿; ￿0 = ￿g:
Now we show that the utility possibility correspondence is well-behaved, i.e. it
is compact and convex-valued. Convexity follows from the strict concavity of the
utility functions while compactness is a direct consequence of the compactness of the
consumption set and the continuity of the utility functions.
Lemma 3 U(￿;￿) is compact and convex-valued for all (￿;￿)
Lemma 3 suggests that the set of PO allocations can be characterized as the




















￿i ￿ ui; (6)
The maximum in (6) is attained since the problem consists in maximizing a continuous
function on a set that is compact by Lemma 3.
First order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to characterize the solution for
the planner￿ s problem and, consequently, the set of PO allocations. These conditions







= 1 for all i, j 2 I, for all t and all s. (7)
I X
i=1
ci;t(s) = y(st). (8)
Here we explain in detail why conditions (7) and (8) imply that PO allocations are






j(cj;0), the planner distributes consump-
tion such that the ratio of marginal valuations of any two agents -which, we recall,
include priors that could be subjectively held- is constant along time. Consequently,





be proportional to the likelihood ratio of the agents￿priors,
Pj;t(s)
Pi;t(s). Whenever this
16ratio is constant along time (for instance, when all agents have the same priors), the
optimal distribution rule is both time and history independent. Therefore, individual
consumption depends only upon the current shock st (because it determines aggregate
output) and the ￿xed vector of welfare weights ￿. When agents have heterogeneous
priors, instead, the likelihood ratio is typically history dependent.
Now we argue that this history dependence can be handled with a properly chosen














￿K￿1 ￿(s1):::￿(sk) ￿i;st (d￿)
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then the planner does not need to know the partial history itself in order to con-
tinue the date 0 optimal plan from date t onwards. Indeed, since ￿i;st (d￿) =
￿(st) ￿i;st￿1(d￿)
R
￿K￿1 ￿(st) ￿i;st￿1(d￿), it is su¢ cient that he knows the ratio of marginal utilities at




j(cj;t(s)), the state of nature at date t, st, and
the posterior beliefs, ￿st￿1 (d￿): Moreover, since the ratio of marginal utilities at date
t equals the likelihood ratio weighted by the date zero welfare weights,
￿j Pj;t(s)
￿iPi;t(s) , the
di¢ culties stemming from the optimal plan history dependence can be handled by
using (￿1P1;t(s);:::;￿IPI;t(s);￿st￿1) as state variables summarizing the history and
the state of nature at date t, st, describing aggregate resources.
From the discussion above, we conclude that a PO allocation cannot be fully
characterized using only the agents￿beliefs over the unknown parameters (that is,
￿st￿1) and st as state variables as in the single agent setting (see, for example, Easley
and Kiefer [7]). In a multiple agent setting, instead, the planner needs to distribute
consumption and because of this one needs to introduce (￿1P1;t(s);:::;￿IPI;t(s)) as
an additional state variable.
In Section 4.2 below we present a formal exposition of this result. But ￿rst, we
establish some properties of the value function v￿.
Lemma 4 The value function v￿(￿;￿;￿) is bounded and continuous for all (￿;￿;￿).
Moreover, v￿ is homogeneous of degree 1 (hereafter HOD 1) and increasing in ￿:
To conclude this section, we characterize the utility possibility correspondence
and show that the set of PO allocations can be parametrized by welfare weights ￿.
Lemma 5 u 2 U(￿;￿) if and only if u ￿ 0 and v￿(￿;￿;￿) ￿ ￿u for all ￿ 2 ￿I￿1:
174.2 Recursive Characterization of PO Allocations
Given that PO allocations are typically history dependent, standard recursive
methods cannot be applied. We tackle this issue by adapting the method developed
by Lucas and Stokey [17]. They characterize recursively optimal allocation prob-
lems in a deterministic setting when the history dependence is induced by recursive
preferences. We use the same strategy to characterize recursively the set of PO al-
locations in our stochastic framework where the history dependence is due to prior
belief heterogeneity.
In order to extend the Principle of Optimality to our economy, we ￿rst provide
a recursive characterization of the frontier of U(￿;￿). For each agent i, the law of




B ￿(￿) ￿i (d￿)
R
￿K￿1 ￿(￿) ￿i (d￿)
for any B 2 B(￿K￿1). (9)
Given ￿0








De￿ne kfk = sup(￿;￿;￿) j f(￿;￿;￿) : ￿ 2 ￿I￿1 j and let
F ￿ ff : S ￿ RI
+ ￿ P(￿K￿1) ! R+ : f is continuous and kfk < 1g:
FH ￿ ff 2 F : f is increasing and HOD 1 in ￿g
FH is a closed subset of the Banach space F and thus a Banach space itself.
Continuity is with respect to the weak topology and thus the metric on F is induced
by k:k:




























i(￿0) for all ￿0(￿0) and ￿0. (12)
18In the following proposition we establish that the operator T is a contraction on
FH and then we apply standard arguments to show that the operator has a unique
￿xed point in FH.
Proposition 6 There is a unique function v 2 FH solving (10)-(12)and the corre-
sponding policy functions are continuous.
Let v 2 FH be the unique solution to (10) - (12), i.e. v = Tv, where
(c;￿0;u0) : S ￿ RI
+ ￿ P(￿K￿1) ! R+ ￿ RI
+ ￿ RI
+
denote the corresponding set of policy functions. Given (s0;￿0;￿0), we say that a set
of policy functions (c;￿0;u
0
) generates an allocation b c if
b ci;t(s) = ci(st;￿t(s)),
￿t+1(s) = ￿0(st;￿t(s);￿st￿1)(st+1),
￿st = ￿0(st;￿st￿1),
for all i and all t ￿ 0 and s 2 S1 where ￿s￿1 = ￿0.
In the recursive dynamic program de￿ned by (10) - (12), the planner takes as given
(￿;￿;￿) and allocates current consumption and continuation utility levels among
agents. It follows from convexity of U(￿;￿) that for a given vector of utility levels in
the frontier, there is an associated vector of welfare weights (which is unique up to a
normalization). Therefore, the optimal choice of continuation utility levels induces a
law of motion for welfare weights. Now we show that there is a one-to-one mapping
between the set of PO allocations and the allocations generated by the optimal policy
functions solving (10) - (12).
Proposition 7 (Principle of Optimality) v￿ 2 FH is the unique solution to (10)
- (12). Moreover, an allocation (c￿
i)I
i=1 is PO given (￿;￿;￿) if and only if it is
generated by the set of policy functions solving (10) - (12).
Informally, this result can be grasped as follows. The characterization of the
solution to the sequential formulation of the planner￿ s problem hints that once the
planner knows both the likelihood ratio weighted by the date zero welfare weights and
the beliefs at date t, he can continue the optimal plan from date t onwards. It is key
to understand that the consumption plan from date t+1 onwards can be summarized
by its associated utility level. Proposition 7 shows that the date zero optimal plan is
19consistent in the sense that the continuation plan is indeed the solution from date t
onwards.
Now we de￿ne the set of policy functions solving problem (10) - (12) . The law of










i(ci(￿;￿))) = y(￿): (13)
for each i 2 I, where (u0
h)￿1 denotes the inverse of u0





















It follows by standard arguments that (13) is the corresponding consumption
policy function. The (normalized) law of motion for the welfare weights (14) follows
from the ￿rst order conditions with respect to the continuation utility levels for each
individual. Observe that the normalization is harmless since optimal policy functions
are HOD zero with respect to ￿. (see Lucas and Stokey [17] for related results).
5 Determinants of the Financial Wealth Distribution
In this section we study the determinants of the ￿nancial wealth distribution that
supports a dynamically complete markets equilibrium allocation. First, we charac-
terize individual ￿nancial wealth recursively as a time invariant function of (￿;￿;￿).
The current state, ￿, captures the impact of changes in aggregate output while (￿;￿)
summarizes and isolates the dependence upon history introduced by the evolving
degree of heterogeneity. Later, we employ a properly adapted recursive version of
the Negishi￿ s approach to pin down the PO allocation that can be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium without transfers.
Given (￿;￿;￿), we construct individual consumption using (13) and de￿ne the
stochastic discount factor by







where the choice of agent 1 to de￿ne M is without loss of generality since Pareto
optimality implies that the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are equalized
across agents.
20The functional equation that determines agent i0s ￿nancial wealth is




where ￿0(￿;￿) and ￿0(￿;￿;￿)(￿0) are given by (9) and (14), respectively. Note that
(16) computes recursively the present discounted value of agent i￿ s excess demand.
In Proposition 8, we show that Ai is well-de￿ned. Furthermore, we apply Negishi￿ s
approach to show that there exist a welfare weight such that Ai is zero for every i:
Proposition 8 Suppose A.0 and A.1 hold. Then, there is a unique continuous func-
tion Ai solving (16). Moreover, for each (s0;￿0) there exists ￿0 = ￿(s0;￿0) 2 RI
+
such that Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) = 0 for all i.
5.1 The Fixed Equilibrium Portfolio Property
We say that the ￿xed equilibrium portfolio (FEP hereafter) property holds if
there exists fai(1);:::;ai(K)g 2 <K such that ai(￿) = Ai(￿;￿;￿) for all (￿;￿;￿) and
all i. If the FEP property holds, any portfolio that decentralizes a PO allocation
with a ￿xed set of non-redundant assets is kept constant over time and across states.
Judd et al. [15] show that the FEP property is always satis￿ed after a once-and-for
all initial rebalancing when agents have homogeneous priors. Indeed, in their setting
the solution to (16) is independent of (￿;￿), i.e. ai(￿) = Ai(￿;￿;￿) for all (￿;￿;￿),
and, therefore, the agents￿￿nancial wealth is a vector in RK in any dynamically
complete markets equilibrium.
In our setting, instead, portfolios typically change as the welfare weights de-
termining the evolution of the wealth distribution change as time and uncertainty
unfold. Therefore, the FEP property does not hold in a dynamically complete mar-
kets equilibrium when priors are heterogenous implying that the result in Judd et
al. [15] is not robust to the introduction of this margin of heterogeneity. However,
since agents observe the same data and update their priors in a Bayesian fashion, a
pending deeper question is whether this trading activity fades out as this margin of
heterogeneity vanishes. Stated in a more technical language: Do welfare weights nec-
essarily converge, exhausting changes in portfolios? Our recursive approach permits
to study this issue directly.
The following proposition, a direct consequence of the continuity of Ai, relates
the asymptotic behavior of ￿t and ￿st with the set of paths where the FEP property
holds asymptotically. Given (s0;￿0;￿0), de￿ne
￿t+1(s) = ￿0(st;￿t(s);￿st￿1)(st+1),
where ￿st = ￿0(st;￿st￿1), ￿(s0) = ￿0 and ￿s￿1 = ￿0.
21Proposition 9 Suppose A.0 and A.1 hold. If ￿t(s) and ￿st converge on s, then
Ai(￿;￿t(s);￿st￿1) converges on s for every i and ￿ 2 S and, consequently, the FEP
property holds asymptotically.
Proposition 9 underscores that if a PO allocation can be decentralized through a
sequence of markets, the associated wealth distribution converges to a ￿xed vector
for each ￿ on every path s on which both ￿t(s) and ￿st￿1 converge. Consequently,
asset trading reduces to the minimum.
The limit behavior of ￿st￿1 under Bayesian updating is well understood (see
Lemma 2). On the other hand, very little is known about the evolution of the welfare
weights that decentralize a PO allocation. We address this issue in the following
section.
6 Limiting Welfare Weights under A.1
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Here, we show that when agents agree on the likelihood function generating the
data (A:1 holds), likelihood ratios converge and so do welfare weights. However, we
need to distinguish the case where the support of the agents￿prior beliefs is countable
from that when it is uncountable. When the support is countable, the true probability
distribution is always absolutely continuous with respect to the agents￿priors and,
therefore, the convergence of likelihood ratios follows from the well-known result in
Blackwell and Dubins [1]. The assumption of countable support, however, seems too
strong since it rules out, for instance, the case of prior beliefs that satisfy assumption
A:2. When A:2 holds, the probability distribution that generates the data is never
absolutely continuous with respect to the agents￿priors and so Blackwell and Dubins￿
result does not apply.11 Nonetheless, we show that likelihood ratios converge applying
a recent result by Phillips and Ploberger [21].
11Blume and Easley [3] also emphasize this point.
226.1 Countable Support
We ￿rst consider the case where the support of every agent￿ s prior belief is
countable (i.e., for every i, the set B 2 B(￿K￿1) such that ￿i;0(B) = 1 is countable)
and, therefore, the true probability distribution is absolutely continuous with respect
to the agents￿priors. As Blackwell and Dubins [1] show, this condition is equivalent to
the convergence to a positive (￿nite) number of the ratio of the agent￿ s prior through
date t to the true probability distribution of the ￿rst t states. Indeed, in Proposition




! ￿i;0 (￿￿) P￿￿
￿ a:s: (18)
Proposition 10 Suppose A.0 and A.1 hold. If the support of every agent￿ s prior
belief is countable and ￿i;0 (￿￿) > 0, then (18) holds.
In turn, Proposition 10 implies that the agent￿ s likelihood ratios also have a ￿nite















Since Ah is homogeneous of degree zero and ￿h;st￿1 converges weakly to ￿￿￿ for
every agent h, it follows by Lemma 2 that for every state ￿ 2 f1;:::;Kg,
Ah(￿;￿t(s);￿st￿1) ! Ah(￿;￿￿;￿￿￿) P￿￿
￿ a:s:
where, for every h, ￿￿
h = ￿h;0 ￿h;0 (￿￿) and ￿h;0 is the welfare weight de￿ned in Propo-
sition 8. Therefore, we obtain the following result which completely characterizes the
limiting properties of the economy.
Theorem 11 Suppose A.0 and A.1 hold. If the support of every agent￿ s prior belief
is countable and ￿i;0 (￿￿) > 0, then every e¢ cient allocation converges to the Pareto
optimal allocation parametrized by
￿




thermore, the FEP property holds asymptotically where ah(￿) = Ah(￿;￿￿;￿￿￿) for all
￿ and h 2 I.
6.2 Uncountable Support
Now we turn to the case where the agent￿ s prior satis￿es A:1 and A:2. Since
Blackwell and Dubins￿ result does not apply, we invoke a result in Phillips and
Ploberger [21, Theorem 4.1] (stated in the appendix for completeness) to establish
23that there exists a sequence of measures Qh;t on (S1;Ft) that approximates Ph;t in
the sense that the likelihood ratio
Ph;t
Qh;t converges to 1.
Although there are several alternative asymptotically equivalent forms for Qh;t,
















, b ￿t is the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) of ￿, Bt (￿) is
the conditional quadratic variation of the score and Bt = Bt (￿￿).
In fact, under assumptions A:0, A:1 and A:2, the aforementioned result by Phillips











where ￿￿ is a constant depending upon ￿￿ that we de￿ne properly in the Appendix.
Proposition 12 Suppose A.0 and A.1 hold. If every agent￿ s prior belief satis￿es
A.2, then (20) holds.
















By a reasoning analogous to the one we used in the countable case, it follows that
for every state ￿ 2 f1;:::;Kg,
Ah(￿;￿t(s);￿st￿1) ! Ah(￿;￿￿;￿￿￿) P￿￿
￿ a:s:
where, for every h, ￿￿
h = ￿h;0 fi (￿￿) and ￿h;0 is the welfare weight de￿ned in Propo-
sition 8. We summarize all these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 13 Suppose A.0 and A.1 hold. If every agent￿ s prior belief satis￿es A.2,
then every e¢ cient allocation converges to the Pareto optimal allocation parametrized
by [￿1;0 f1 (￿￿);:::;￿I;0 fI (￿￿)], P￿￿
￿a.s. Furthermore, the FEP property holds as-
ymptotically where ah(￿) = Ah(￿;￿￿;￿￿￿) for all ￿ and h 2 I.
246.3 Discussion
Theorems 11 and 13 argue forcefully that when the true parameter is in the
support of every agent￿ s prior belief and they know the true likelihood function gen-
erating the data (i.e., A:1 holds), the equilibrium allocation of the economy with
heterogeneous priors converges to that of an economy with correct priors where the
wealth distribution is determined by f￿￿
hgh2I : That is, the density of the agents￿
prior beliefs, evaluated at the true parameter, is su¢ cient to pin down the limiting
wealth distribution. This result is particularly appealing since it only requires to
know exogenous parameters describing the economy at date zero. Indeed, it allows
to compute the limiting allocation without solving for the equilibrium.
The mechanics to obtain our results, then, is to exploit Ah￿ s homogeneity of de-
gree zero to normalize welfare weights and then to show the convergence of these
normalized welfare weights. To get a thorough understanding, it is key ￿rst to recog-
nize that the driving force of the equilibrium allocation dynamics is the evolution
of the welfare weights. Observe that agent i￿welfare weight, ￿i, is the planner￿ s







i(￿;￿;￿)(d￿) is the planner￿ s current valuation of an additional unit of
agent i￿ s next period utility at state ￿0. This is the economics behind the law of
motion (17), before normalizing the welfare weights. Secondly, since the evolution of
these weights is fully driven by the behavior of likelihood ratios, we are lead to study
their dynamics.
However, the study of the limit behavior of these ratios is a non-trivial task. The
￿rst problem one faces is that both the numerator and the denominator are vanish-
ing and, consequently, it is crucial to understand their relative rate of convergence.
Evidently, this asks for an appropriate normalization. While looking for the proper
normalization, we found some technical di¢ culties that forced us to treat separately
the cases with countable and uncountable support. In the countable case, the analy-
sis in Blackwell and Dubins [1] suggests that P￿￿
t is the normalization that works.
In the uncountable case, on the other hand, the work of Phillips and Ploberger [21]
suggests that Qh;t is the proper normalization. Therefore, as long as A:1 holds and
the true parameter is in the support of every agent￿ s prior belief, we can conclude
that relative welfare weights converge to positive numbers for both the countable and
the uncountable case.
So far we have made two critical assumptions regarding the support of the agent￿ s
prior belief, namely, (i) it contains the true parameter and (ii) it has the same di-
25mension for every agent. The logic behind these two assumptions is as follows. As
Blume and Easley [3] and Sandroni [22] argue forcefully, when some agent learns the
truth, (i) and (ii) are necessary to rule out that the likelihood ratio converges to zero
for some pair of agents and, therefore, to rule out that the welfare weight goes to
zero for some agent. Evidently, consumption vanishes and their wealth approaches
the so-called natural debt limit (see condition (16)) for those agents whose welfare
weights converge to zero. The limiting economy, therefore, mimics the economy where
those agents￿property rights on their individual endowments have been redistributed
among the remaining agents. But then those agents are basically irrelevant to under-
stand the properties of the long-run behavior of the individuals￿portfolios supporting
PO allocations.
7 Persistent Trade
In this section we give examples to illustrates the necessity of assuming that the
support of every agent￿ s contains the true parameter (section 7.1) and that every
agent knows the true likelihood function (section 7.2) for the FEP property to hold
asymptotically.
7.1 Example 3: Dogmatic Priors
Judd et al. [15] show that, after a once-and-for all initial rebalancing, the FEP
property holds for economies with homogeneous priors. On the one hand, we have
shown forcefully that the FEP property holds asymptotically provided that the agents
have priors satisfying A:1 and the support of their prior beliefs contains the true
parameter. Here we show that this last condition is necessary in the sense that when
it is not satis￿ed, the FEP property may not hold even if agents￿priors satisfy A:1,
no matter how close they are to the truth and with respect to each other.
We assume there are only two agents whose priors beliefs are point masses on ￿1
and ￿2, respectively, where ￿1 6= ￿2 and ￿￿ ln ￿1
￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿￿) ln 1￿￿1
1￿￿2 = 0: Since agents
have heterogeneous "dogmatic" priors with the same entropy, then it can be shown
that both agents survive.12 The ratio of one-period-ahead conditional probabilities,
p1(￿0jst)







of the likelihood ratio can be written as the sum of conditional zero mean random
12An agent survive on a path if his consumption does not converge to zero on that path. See
Blume and Easley [4] for a general analysis of optimal consumption paths in i.i.d. economies where




































(xkjFk￿1)(s) = 0 and varP￿￿










> 0. So, the log likelihood ratio is the sum of uniformly bounded random
variables with zero conditional mean and conditional variance bounded away from




















Inspecting condition (17), it is evident that welfare weights do not converge in this
example. Since prior beliefs are degenerate at ￿i, posteriors are also degenerated at
￿i and, therefore, agent i￿ s ￿nancial wealth is Ai(￿;￿t(s);(￿￿1;￿￿2)). We can conclude
that the FEP property does not necessarily hold asymptotically.
7.2 Example 4: Di⁄erent Likelihood Functions
In example 2 we show that the FEP property does not hold asymptotically when
no agent satis￿es A:1. To underscore the importance of assuming that A:1 holds for
every agent, here consider, instead, the case in which A:1 does not hold for one agent
while it holds for the other. One agent, on the one hand, has a prior satisfying A:1
and A:2 and, therefore, he ends up learning the true parameter with the implication
that his one-period-ahead conditional probabilities converge to the truth. The other
agent, on the other hand, does not know the likelihood function generating the data
(i.e., he has a wrong "model" in mind). For some partial histories his one-period-
ahead conditional probabilities are correct while for some others they are incorrect.
The appealing feature of this example is not only that he survives but also the FEP
property does not hold since agent 2 generates genuine asset trading in￿nitely often.
27For simplicity, we assume there are only two states of nature every period, that
is K = 2. For a ￿xed prior satisfying A:1 and A:2 for agent 1, let ￿￿ 2 ￿1 be an
element of the support of agent 1￿ s prior belief such that ￿1;st
w ! ￿￿￿, P￿￿
￿ a:s: By
Lemma 2 we know ￿￿ lies in a ￿1;0￿full measure subset of ￿1. Choose also ￿ 2 ￿1




















is given by the true one period-ahead conditional probability when-
ever the likelihood ratio ￿t
k=1
e p￿(skjsk￿1)
p1(skjsk￿1) is smaller than or equal to one. When that
ratio is strictly greater than one, on the other hand, e p￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿st￿
is given by ￿ 2 ￿1.
Now we construct a probability measure on (S1;F) with the property that, after















1 (s) ￿ e p￿ (s1 js0)
e P￿
t+1 (s) ￿ e p￿ ￿
st+1
￿ ￿st￿ e P￿




and 8t ￿ 1.
By the Kolmogorov￿ s Extension Theorem there exists a unique probability measure






when restricted to f(S1;Ft)g
1
t=0.





e P￿ : ￿ 2 ￿1
o
consist of probability measures on (S1;F) such




7.2.1 Agent 2￿ s priors
Now we are ready to de￿ne agent 2￿ s priors. Clearly, there exists 0 < " < 1 such
that




(￿￿ logm + (1 ￿ ￿￿) log(1 ￿ m)),
and let m￿
t denote the i.i.d. random variable that takes values m￿ and 1￿m￿ in states
1 and 2, respectively. Let ￿￿
t denote the i.i.d. random variable that takes values ￿￿
and 1 ￿ ￿￿ in states 1 and 2, respectively.




P￿ (B)￿1;0 (d￿) for any B 2 F.




e P￿ (B)￿2;0 (d￿) = e Pm￿
(B),













Remark 2: Notice that agent 2￿ s one period-ahead probabilities are in￿nitely
often bounded away from the true one period-ahead conditional probability and so
he never learns the true parameter. At ￿rst reading this seems to contradict Lemma
2 above. However, that Lemma only asserts that for almost all possible parameters,
according to agent 2￿prior belief, he almost surely learn the parameter value. But
according to agent 2￿ s prior belief, ￿￿ is in a zero measure set and so there is no reason
to expect consistency when ￿￿ is the true parameter generating the data.
The following proposition shows that the likelihood ratio of 2￿ s prior to 1￿ s prior
￿ uctuates between 1 and +1. The intuition behind this result is as follows. On
the one hand, the likelihood ratio cannot be both bounded away from and greater
than one eventually. If this were the case, agent 2￿ s one-period-ahead conditional
probability would be bounded away from the truth eventually. Since agent 1￿ s one-
period-ahead conditional probability converges to the truth, the likelihood ratio would
converge to zero almost surely. But this contradicts the assumption that the likeli-
hood ratio is greater than one eventually. On the other hand, the set of paths where
the likelihood ratio is greater than one in￿nitely often has full measure. To see this,
consider its complement, the set of paths where the likelihood ratio is smaller or
equal to one in ￿nite time. On those paths, agent 2￿ s one-period-ahead conditional
probability is correct in ￿nite time and, since agent 1￿ s prior satis￿es A:1 and A:2,
the likelihood ratio diverges almost surely, contradicting the initial assumption.13
Therefore, the set of paths where the likelihood ratio is smaller than or equal to one
in ￿nite time must have zero measure. Finally, since the ratio of one-period-ahead
conditional probabilities is bounded away from one in￿nitely often, the likelihood
13If agent 1 had a prior belief with countable support (so that A:2 does not hold) then the truth
would be absolute continuous with respect to 1￿ s prior and so the likelihood ratio would not diverge
even if 2 were correct every period.
29ratio exceeds any pre-speci￿ed upper bound in￿nitely often on the set of paths where
the likelihood ratio is greater than one in￿nitely often.14 Thus, it must diverge along
some subsequence of periods.
Proposition 14 Suppose A.0 holds. If agent 1￿ s prior satis￿es A:1 and A:2, then
liminf
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) ￿ 1 and limsup
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) = +1 P￿￿
￿ a:s:
7.2.2 Dynamics of Portfolios: On the Failure of the FEP property
We consider again the economy described in Section 3 where portfolios are given
by (4). Proposition 14 makes it clear that agents 1 and 2 survive. Agent 1￿ s one-
period-ahead conditional probabilities converge to the truth while agent 2 makes mis-
takes in￿nitely often. However, agent 2￿ s one-period-ahead conditional probabilities
are also correct in￿nitely often. Whether this is su¢ cient to o⁄set the disadvantage
stemming from his mistakes depends on the speed of agent 1￿ s learning process. As-
sumption A:2 ensures that this convergence rate is small enough to make both agents
survive. Moreover, since the likelihood ratio ￿ uctuations do not damp out, wealth
￿ uctuations do not damp out either. It follows immediately that the FEP property
fails and, consequently, asset trading purely generated by heterogeneous priors does
not vanish. We summarize these results in the following proposition; the proof is
omitted since it is a direct consequence of Proposition 14 and the arguments above.
Proposition 15 Suppose A.0 holds. If agent 1￿ s prior satis￿es A:1 and A:2, then,
P￿￿
￿ a:s::
(a) agents 1 and 2 survive on s.
(b) the wealth of agent 1 is in￿nitely often close to its lower bound on s.
(c) the FEP property does not hold on s.
7.2.3 Further Remarks
In Sandroni￿ s [22] terminology, agent 1 eventually makes accurate next period
predictions while agent 2 does not and yet both agent survive. At a ￿rst glance,
14To see why, consider the event where the ratio of agent 2￿ s to agent 1￿ s one-period-ahead condi-
tional probabilities is bounded away from one. The conditional probability of that event is bounded
away from zero in￿nitely often on the set of paths where the likelihood ratio is greater than one
in￿nitely often. This is because only agent 1￿ s one-period-ahead conditional probability converges
to the truth on those paths. Therefore, the conditional probability of the event "the likelihood ratio
exceeds a pre-speci￿ed upper bound in a ￿xed number of periods" is also bounded away from zero
in￿nitely often on the set of paths where the likelihood ratio is greater than one in￿nitely often. To
clinch the result we need to argue that such event actually occurs in￿nitely often. An application of
Levy￿ s conditional form of the Second Borel-Cantelli Lemma shows the latter is true on the set of
paths where the likelihood ratio exceeds one in￿nitely often.
30then, Proposition 15 (a) might seem to contradict the results in Sandroni. However,
no contradiction exists because this example does not satisfy the assumptions of
his propositions. Indeed, his ￿rst result applies to the case in which the truth is
absolutely continuous with respect to some agent￿ s prior, an assumption that is not
satis￿ed in this example (again, A:0, A:1 and A:2 rule out absolute continuity for
agent 1). His second result concerns economies where agents whose one-period-ahead
conditional probabilities converge to the truth coexist with others whose one-period-
ahead conditional probabilities are bounded away from the truth eventually. This
result does not apply either because agent 2 does not belong to any of these categories.
This example does not ￿t in the general setting described by Blume and Easley
[3] either since they only consider economies where every agent￿ s prior satis￿es A:1.15
That is, the margin of heterogeneity in priors they consider is the one arising from
di⁄erences in the dimension of the agents￿support. However, since nothing in the
Savage approach to decision making imposes assumption A:1, it is also important to
address the e⁄ect of the margin of heterogeneity stemming from di⁄erences in the
agents￿likelihood functions (i.e., agents having di⁄erent models). Since we assumed
that agent 1￿ s prior satis￿es A:1 while agent 2￿ s prior does not (because he does not
know the true likelihood function), our example explores that margin. Our ￿ndings,
stated in Proposition 15, strongly suggest that the additional assumption A:1 shuts
down a margin of heterogeneity that might be critical not only for survival but also
for asset pricing and trading volume.
8 Concluding Remarks
If agents know the likelihood function generating the data and every agent has
the true probability distribution over states of nature in the support of her prior
beliefs, then investors change their portfolios with the arrival of new information but
these changes necessarily vanish in any dynamically complete markets equilibrium.
Therefore, persistent changes in portfolios can be attributed to di⁄erences of opinion
about the content of new information only if one assumes that either (i) no agent has
the true parameters in the support of her prior beliefs or (ii) agents disagree on the
likelihood function generating the data or (iii) the probability of the states of nature
changes along time.
15They do have an example in which agent 1 satis￿es A:1 while agent 2 does not and yet the
latter survives. However, their example di⁄ers from ours in that agent 2 not only learns the true
one-period-ahead conditional probability but also, and most importantly, likelihood ratios converge
with probability one.
319 Appendix A
In this Appendix we show that (4), used throughout Examples 1 - 4, denotes the
equilibrium Arrow security holdings.












The ￿rst order conditions imply that
￿i ￿t Pi;t (s)
1
ci;t (s)(￿)
= ￿t(s)(￿) for all i, t and s, (21)
where ￿t(s)(￿) denotes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the feasibility con-




￿i Pi;t(s)+￿j Pj;t(s) yt (s) for all i, t and s. (22)
Let ￿i;t(s)(￿) =
￿t(s)(￿)
















￿i Pi;t+￿j Pj;t ￿ ￿i
￿!
:
Using (21) and (22) it is easy to check that
Ai;0(￿) =
y(s0)
1￿￿ (￿i ￿ ￿i):
It is a routine exercise to show that the PO allocation corresponding to (￿1;￿2) =
(￿1;￿2) can be decentralized a competitive equilibrium with sequential trading where
a full set of Arrow securities can be traded. To pin down the corresponding asset











































; ￿0 2 f1;2g:
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since Bst ￿ C(st).
Proof of Lemma 3. Boundedness follows because Y 1 is bounded: Convexity
follows from the strict concavity of ui:
To prove that U(￿;￿) is closed, take any sequence fung such that un 2 U(￿;￿) for
all n and un ! u 2 RI
+: Take the corresponding sequence fcng ￿ Y 1. Since Y 1 is
compact under the sup-norm, there exists a convergent subsequence fcnkg such that




i ) ￿ u
nk
i for all k and for
all i: Since U
Pi
i is continuous and C is compact, then U
Pi
i is continuous under the
sup-norm. Thus, it follows that U
Pi
i (ci) ￿ ui; for all i: Consequently, u 2 U(￿;￿) by
de￿nition and U(￿;￿) is closed.
Proof of Lemma 4. Boundedness follows because Y 1 is bounded and ￿ 2
(0;1):
Let Y k ￿ fc 2 Y : ci(st) ￿ ci;t (s) = 0 for all t ￿ kg be the k￿truncated set of
feasible allocations. Note that Y k ￿ Y k+1 ￿ Y 1 and de￿ne
v￿
k(￿;￿;￿) ￿ max













is a sequence of probability measures such that ￿n
i converges


































is continuous and bounded for all t and st. Thus, it follows from the
Maximum Theorem that v￿
k(￿;￿;￿) is continuous in (￿;￿) for all ￿:
Note that v￿
k(￿;￿;￿) ￿ v￿
k+1(￿;￿;￿) ￿ v￿(￿;￿;￿) for all (￿;￿;￿): Hence, v￿
k(￿;￿;￿) !
v￿(￿;￿;￿) for each (￿;￿;￿) since there exists some c￿ 2 Y 1 attaining v￿(￿;￿;￿): Now
we show that this convergence is uniform.
Given any (￿;￿;￿); let c￿ 2 Y 1 attain v￿(￿;￿;￿) and de￿ne c￿k
as its k￿truncated
version: Then,
















Since ￿ 2 (0;1), this convergence is uniform (i.e., the RHS is independent of (￿;￿;￿))
and thus v￿(￿;￿;￿) is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 5. For any u 2 U(￿;￿); it follows by de￿nition (6) that
v￿(￿;￿;￿) ￿ ￿u for all ￿ 2 ￿I￿1: To show the converse, suppose that u ￿ 0 and
v￿(￿;￿;￿) ￿ ￿u for all ￿ 2 ￿I￿1 but u = 2 U(￿;￿): This implies that @ e u 2 U(￿;￿)
such that e u ￿ u: Since U(￿;￿) is convex, it follows by the separating hyperplane
theorem that 9 ! 2 RI
+=f0g such that !u ￿ !e u for all e u 2 U(￿;￿): Since U(￿;￿) is
closed, !u > !e u for all e u 2 U(￿;￿), where ! can be normalized such that ! 2 ￿I￿1:
But then v￿(￿;!;￿) ￿ ! u > !e u for all e u 2 U(￿;￿): This contradicts (6).
Proof of Proposition 6. We ￿rst show that T : FH ! FH.
Suppose that f 2 FH: Since ui(ci) ￿ maxui(y) and 0 ￿ u0
i(￿0) ￿
￿ ￿f(￿0)
￿ ￿ for all
i and all ￿0, it follows that kTfk < 1: Since ￿
0
(￿;￿) is weakly continuous in ￿ for
all ￿ (Easley and Kiefer [7, Theorem 1]), it follows by the Maximum Theorem that
(Tf)(￿;￿;￿) is continuous in (￿;￿) for all ￿ (Easley and Kiefer [7, Theorem 3]). Note
that this implies that there exists a solution that attains (Tf)(￿;￿;￿):
Observe that ￿
0
(￿;￿) does not depend on ￿ and consequently the constraint cor-
respondence is independent of welfare weights. Thus, it follows from standard argu-
ments that (Tf)(￿;￿;￿) is HOD 1 and increasing in ￿. Consequently, T : FH ! FH:
Now we show that the operator T satis￿es Blackwell￿ s su¢ cient conditions.


































and then the constraint set is enlarged. Consequently, (Tv)(￿;￿;￿) ￿ (Tg)(￿;￿;￿)
for all (￿;￿;￿):
(ii) Discounting. Consider any arbitrary a > 0 and let
￿
b c; b u0(￿0)
￿
attain T(f +a).
Fix (￿0;￿0(￿;￿)); denote f(￿) = f(￿0;￿;￿0) and de￿ne
Ua ￿ fu 2 RI
+ : f(￿) + a ￿ ￿ ￿ u; 8￿ 2 ￿I￿1g;
B ￿ fu 2 RI
+ : u ￿ u0 + a; for some u0 2 U0g:
To show that B ￿ Ua, notice that u 2 B implies that ￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿ ￿ (u0 + a) ￿
￿￿f (￿)+a for all ￿ 2 ￿I￿1, since u0 2 U0 implies ￿￿u0 ￿ ￿￿f (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿I￿1.
To check that Ua ￿ B, consider any u 2 Ua: There are three cases to consider
corresponding to di⁄erent regions in Figure 1 below. (i) If u ￿ a (see Region I, Figure
I), let u0 = 0 2 U0 and thus u 2 B (see Region I). (ii) If u ￿ a (see Region II); let
u0 = u ￿ a ￿ 0 and thus u0 2 U0 since for any ￿ 2 ￿I￿1, ￿ ￿ u0 = ￿ ￿ (u ￿ a) =
￿ ￿ u ￿ a ￿ f(￿).
(iii) To consider the third case (see Regions III and IV), suppose to simplify that
I = 2 and let u1 ￿ a and u2 < a. Fix u2, let ￿ 2 [0;1] and de￿ne
Ua
1(u2) ￿ fu1 ￿ 0 : f(￿;1 ￿ ￿) + a ￿ ￿u1 + (1 ￿ ￿)u2; 8￿ 2 [0;1]g
= fu1 ￿ 0 : f(￿;1 ￿ ￿) + (a ￿ u2) ￿ ￿(u1 ￿ u2); 8￿ 2 [0;1]g:
De￿ne ua
1(u2) ￿ supUa























= f(1;0) + (a ￿ u2) + u2 = f(1;0) + a;
35where the second line follows from HOD 1 and the last line from the monotonicity as-
sumption about f and (a￿u2) > 0: Very importantly, note that ua
1(u2) is independent
of u2 for all u2 ￿ a, i.e. ua
1(u2) = ua
1 = f(1;0) + a for all u2 ￿ a.
De￿ne u0 = (f(1;0);0) ￿ 0 and let ￿ 2 ￿I￿1. If ￿1 = 0, then ￿ ￿ u0 = 0 ￿ f (￿):
If ￿1 > 0; then






￿ ￿1 f (1;0) = ￿ ￿ u0;
and thus u0 2 U0:16 Finally, notice that u ￿ (ua
1;a) = u0 + a and u0 2 U0: Conse-
















Figure 1: Figure 1
Notice that if (b c; b u0) attain T(f + a); then there exists e u0(￿0) 2 U0 such that
16We underscore here that without assuming that f is HOD 1 and monotone (i.e., f 2








= 1: If any of these two assumptions is not satis￿ed (i.e., f = 2 FH),



















1 + a ￿ u2:
36e u0(￿0) ￿ b u0(￿0) ￿ a for all ￿0: By monotonicity,
￿
b c; e u0(￿0) + a
￿
also attain T(f + a):































and therefore, since (￿;￿;￿) was arbitrarily chosen, we can conclude that the operator
T satis￿es discounting. Consequently, it follows by the contraction mapping theorem
that there exists a unique v 2 FH such that v = Tv:
Proof of Proposition 7. Given s0 = ￿ and ci 2 C; de￿ne for each ￿0




















































































￿ 0 for all ￿0(￿0) 2 ￿I￿1: Here,
the second line follows from the de￿nition of U
Pi
i (ci); the third follows from the
de￿nition of U(￿0;￿0(￿;￿)) and the last from Lemma 5. Consequently, v￿ uniquely
solves (RPP) by de￿nition.
Now we claim that the set of policy functions (c;￿0;u
0
) solving (RPP) generates
a Pareto optimal allocation. Consider the allocation b c given by
b ci;t(s) = ci(st;￿t(s))
￿t+1(s) = ￿0(st;￿t(s);￿st￿1)(st+1)
￿st = ￿0(st;￿st￿1),
with ￿(s0) = ￿0 and ￿s￿1 = ￿0: Suppose that this allocation is not Pareto optimal.


















































2 U(￿0;￿0(￿;￿)) for all ￿0.









for all ￿0 2 ￿I￿1 and all ￿0: But this contradicts that the policy functions (c;￿0;u
0
)
solves (RPP) for v￿:
On the other hand, since the argument holds for any arbitrary feasible b c; the











solve (10) - (12).
Proof of Proposition 8. Let F be de￿ned as before. Consider the alternative
operator e T de￿ned by












and observe that ￿0 and ￿0 are both continuous. Also, it follows by de￿nition that
pr(￿0)(￿0
1(￿;￿)) is continuous. Thus, the expression 23 is continuous in (￿;￿;￿): Since
M is bounded, its boundedness is a direct consequence of
P
￿0 P(￿0 k ￿0
i(￿;￿)) = 1.
Notice now that u0
1(c1(￿;￿;￿)) = ￿i
￿1u0
i(ci(￿;￿;￿)) for all i. Since ui is concave for
all i, it follows that
0 ￿ cu0
i(c) ￿ ui(c) ￿ ui(y);











Consequently, (ci(￿;￿;￿) ￿ yi(￿))u0
1(c1(￿;￿;￿)) is uniformly bounded. Clearly, it
is also continuous since the policy functions are continuous. Thus, we can conclude
that e TM 2 F:
Step 2. Now we check that e T satis￿es Blackwell￿ s su¢ cient conditions and, thus,
it is a contraction mapping.
We start with discounting. Consider any a > 0 and note that







= (e T(M)(￿;￿;￿) + ￿a:
Monotonicity is obvious. If M(￿;￿;￿) ￿ D(￿;￿;￿) for all (￿;￿;￿), it is immediate
that (e TM)(￿;￿;￿) ￿ (e TD)(￿;￿;￿) for all (￿;￿;￿):
Therefor, we can apply the contraction mapping theorem to conclude that e T is a
contraction with a unique solution Mi 2 F for each i.
To complete the proof, de￿ne Ai(￿;￿;￿) = Mi(￿;￿;￿)=u0
1(c1(￿;￿;￿)): It can be
checked immediately that Ai is a continuous function which is the unique ￿xed point



















39Note that the operator de￿ned by (24) has a unique solution as well. Since R(￿;￿;￿) =
0 for all (￿;￿;￿) solves (24), it follows by uniqueness that
X
i
Ai(￿;￿;￿) = 0; for all (￿;￿;￿).
Step 3. Finally, we show that there exists some ￿0 = ￿(s0;￿0) such that Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) =
0 for all i, given (s0;￿0):
Note ￿rst that if ￿i = 0; then ci(￿;￿;￿) = 0 and consequently Ai(￿;￿;￿) < 0 for




i max[￿i ￿ Ai(s0;￿;￿0);0]
, (25)
for each i: Note that H(￿) =
P
i max[￿i￿Ai(s0;￿;￿0);0] is positive for all ￿ 2 ￿I￿1.
Also, gi(￿) 2 [0;1] and
P
i gi(￿) = 1 for all ￿: Thus, g is a continuous function
mapping ￿I￿1 into itself. The Brower￿ s ￿xed point theorem implies that there exists
some ￿0 = ￿(s0;￿0) such that ￿0 = g(￿0).
Suppose now that ￿i;0 = 0 for some i. By de￿nition (25), this implies that
￿Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) ￿ 0: But we have already argued that ￿Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) > 0 if ￿i;0 =
gi(￿0) = 0. This would lead to a contradiction and, hence, ￿i;0 > 0 for all i. This
implies that ￿i;0 ￿ Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) > 0 for all i. Therefore,
H(￿0)￿i;0 = H(￿0)gi (￿0) = max[￿i;0 ￿ Ai(s0;￿0;￿0);0] = ￿i;0 ￿ Ai(s0;￿0;￿0).






i Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) = 1. There-
fore, ￿i;0 = ￿i;0 ￿ Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) for all i and thus Ai(s0;￿0;￿0) = 0 for all i.
Proof of Proposition 10. Since the support of agent i￿ s prior belief is count-
able, then the true probability distribution over paths is absolutely continuous with






t (s) < 1, (26)
and since P￿￿
is not absolutely continuous with respect to P￿ for all ￿ 6= ￿￿, then
P￿￿






1￿￿i;0(￿). It follows by



























= ￿i;0 (￿￿) +
￿













where the last equality follows by (27).
The following Theorem which is due to Phillips and Ploberger [21, page 392] will
be used in the proof of Proposition 12.
Theorem 16 (Phillips and Ploberger) Assume the following conditions hold:
(C1) lt (￿) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable with derivatives l
(1)






t (￿) is a zero mean L2 martingale and lim
t!1






Bt(￿) + 1 = 0 P￿￿a.s.
(C4) There exist continuous functions wt
￿
￿;￿0￿
such that wt (￿;￿) = 0 and such that
for some ￿ > 0 and for all ￿;￿0 2 N￿ (￿￿) = f￿ : j￿ ￿ ￿￿j < ￿g we have
l
(2)




















￿a.s. uniformly for ￿;￿0 2 N￿ (￿￿) and w1 (￿;￿) = 0.
(C5) lim
t!1
b ￿t = ￿￿, P￿￿
￿a.s.













d￿ = 0 P￿￿
￿ a.s.
(C7) The density of the prior belief, f (￿), is continuous at ￿￿ with f (￿￿) > 0.











Proof of Proposition 12. We need to verify that (C.1) - (C.7) hold. Let nt
be the number of times that state 1 has occurred up to date t.







(￿￿)nt (1￿￿￿)t￿nt is twice continuously di⁄er-
entiable.
41(C.2) holds because l
(1)


































































k￿1 (￿). Then "k (￿) takes values 1
￿ and ￿ 1
1￿￿ with probabilities






























































￿ ! ￿1 P￿ ￿ a:s:; as t ! 1:


















1￿￿￿ . Clearly, wt
￿
￿;￿0￿









uniformly for every ￿;￿0 2 N￿ (￿￿). In addition,
l
(2)























































42(C.5) Notice that b ￿t =
n1;t
t ! ￿￿ P￿￿
￿ a:s: by the SLLN.
(C.6) By the SLLN, we can take T (s) such that for all t ￿ T (s) a:s: P￿￿
,
n1;t





















￿n1;t (1 ￿ ￿)
n2;t
(￿￿)

































where the inequality in the third line holds P￿￿






! 0 as t ! 1.
(C.7) It follows by assumption (A.2).
Proof of Proposition 14. We begin with four claims that will be useful to prove
the main result. Claim 17 shows that the set of paths where liminf
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) ￿ 1 has
full measure. Claim 20 argues that limsup
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) = +1 on the set of paths where
the likelihood ratio is greater than one in￿nitely often. Claims 21 and 22 show that
the latter set also has full measure.
Claim 17 liminf
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) ￿ 1 P ￿ a:s:
Proof of Claim 17. Suppose not. Then, there exists a set of paths ￿1 with
P￿￿




> 1 8s 2 ￿1
Hence, there exists T2 (s) such that for all t ￿ T2 (s)
P2;t (s)
P1;t (s)
> 1 8s 2 ￿1
Since p1;t (s) ! ￿￿ (st) P￿￿
￿ a:s:, there exists T1 (s) such that for every t ￿ T1 (s),
" < p1;t (s) < 1 ￿ ". Let T (s) ￿ maxfT1 (s);T2 (s)g. On the one hand, by the





























> 0 8s 2 ￿1
On the other hand, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers for uncorrelated random
variables with uniformly bounded second moments,
1



















and since p1;t (s) ! ￿￿ (st) P￿￿
￿ a:s:, we also have that
1



















Then it follows that
1


































! 0 as T ! 1 P￿￿
￿a:s,
But this implies that P￿￿
(￿1) = 0, a contradiction.
We continue with two results that we will need to prove Claim 20. The ￿rst
is Levy￿ s conditional form of the Second Borel-Cantelli Lemma which follows from
a more general result due to Freedman ([9, Proposition 39]) and is stated without
proof as Lemma 18. The second result, stated in Lemma 19, shows that on any path
on which some event occurs in￿nitely often, the event consisting of the ￿rst event
followed by any ￿nite string of realizations of state 1 also occurs in￿nitely often.











1;t = fs : st￿N = ::: = st = 1g:
Lemma 18 (Levy￿ s Conditional form of the 2nd Borel-Cantelli Lemma) Let
f￿tg1









E [1￿t jFt￿1](e s) = +1
￿
:
44Lemma 19 Let f￿tg1







1;t(s) = +1 P ￿ a:s: s 2 f￿t i:o:g:
Proof of Lemma 19. Notice that














(s) = ￿1 > 0;
where we use the convention that ￿0








(s) is non-negative otherwise.
For s 2 f￿t i:o:g arbitrarily chosen, there exists a sequence ftkg
1
k=1 such that
s 2 ￿tk for every k = 1;2;￿￿￿. Since ￿0

































and it follows by Lemma 18 that
P1
t=1 1￿t￿1\￿1
1;t(s) = +1 P ￿ a:s: s 2 f￿t i:o:g.
Suppose that the result holds for N ￿ 1. So, for P-a.s s 2 f￿t i:o:g arbitrarily
chosen there exists ftkg
1
k=1 such that s 2 ￿tk￿(N￿1)\￿N￿1

































and it follows by Lemma 18 that
P1
t=1 1￿t￿N\￿N
1;t(s) = +1 P ￿ a:s: s 2 f￿t i:o:g.
That completes the induction argument and the proof.
Claim 20 limsup
Pj;t(s)
P1;t(s) = +1 P￿￿




P1;t(e s) > 1 i.o.
o




P1;t(e s) > 1 i.o.
o
and a > 1. Since p1;t (s) !
￿￿ (st), there exists T (s) such that for every t ￿ T (s), ￿￿ (st) ￿ "
2 ￿ p1;t (s) ￿
￿￿ (st)+ "
2. Then there exists some state ￿, say state 1, such that m￿
t (1) > ￿￿
t (1)+ "
2.













> 1 and e st￿Ta = ::: = e st = 1
￿
45By Lemma 19 it follows that
￿Ta
1;t i.o. P￿￿












P1;t(e s) > 1 i.o.
o
, there exists a sub-subsequence ftkg
1
k=0

































where the ￿rst inequality uses the property that
P2;tk￿1￿Ta(s)



























e s : limsup
P2;t(e s)
P1;t(e s) ￿ 1
o
, there exists T (s) such that
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) ￿
1 8t ￿ T (s)
Proof of Claim 21. Let ￿1 ￿
n
e s : limsup
P2;t(e s)
P1;t(e s) ￿ 1 and
P2;t(e s)
P1;t(e s) > 1 i.o.
o
. Let




P1;t(e s) > 1 i.o.
o





￿ a:s: s 2 ￿1
and it follows that P￿￿
(￿1) = 0, as desired.
Claim 22
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) > 1 i.o. P￿￿
￿ a:s:
46Proof of Claim 22. Let ￿1 ￿
n
s : 9T (s) such that
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) ￿ 1 8t ￿ T (s)
o
and suppose that P￿￿








< 1 for all t ￿ T (s)












Since A:2 implies that P￿￿
is not absolutely continuous with respect to P1, it follows






! +1 as t ! 1
and so a contradiction is reached. It follows that
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) > 1 i.o. P￿￿
￿ a:s:
Now we conclude the proof arguing that limsup
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) = +1 P ￿a:s: Indeed, by
Claim 22,and Claim 21, P￿￿
￿a:s:, limsup
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) > 1 and by Claim 20 one concludes
that limsup
P2;t(s)
P1;t(s) = +1 P￿￿
￿ a:s:
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